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ABSTRACT 
An Assessment of Presentism.  (May 2004) 
Brannon David McDaniel, B.A, Northwest Nazarene University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christopher Menzel 
 
 
There is a debate in the philosophy of time over the status of non-present entities.  
Do these things exist, and if so, what sorts of things are they?  Recently, the debate has 
split into two groups, presentists and eternalists.  Presentists hold that no past or future 
things exist now.  Socrates does not now exist, though he did in the past; my future 
daughter does not now exist, though she may in the future.  Ontologically, the present is 
distinct, serving to demarcate all that currently has existence.  As far as the eternalist is 
concerned, all entities – whether past, present, or future – are equally real.  If it was, is, 
or will be, it can be found in the eternalist picture of time.  As such, there is no distinct 
present at which some entities exist while others do not; rather, everything enjoys the 
same ontological status. 
 I will be concerned to offer an assessment of the presentist view.  Common 
objections against presentism will be examined, amplified, and answered where 
appropriate.  I will not examine the arguments in favor of the presentist view.  Rather, I 
wish to describe why it is that the eternalist feels compelled to deny presentism. 
Ultimately, my goal will be to show that although presentism survives some of 
the current objections raised against it, it does not survive them all.  Presentism is an 
interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory view.  There is a modified form of presentism 
(call it presentism*) that can meet the objections raised against the original position, and 
 iv
after noting some of the objections raised against presentism, I will sketch the outlines of 
presentism* in some detail.  I intend to show that presentism* is able to retain what is 
most valuable about presentism, while also withstanding certain objections that the latter 
view could not. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Framing the Debate – What It Is, and What It Is Not 
Presentism denies that past and future entities exist.  This is the view that I will 
be examining.  Presentism stands in opposition to eternalism, which holds that all 
entities, whether past, present, or future, stand on an equal ontological footing – they all 
exist.  Put a different way, the general question engaging each of these viewpoints is the 
following: do past and future individuals exist in some sense, or are they nothing at all?  
The eternalist takes the former line, while the presentist adopts the latter. 
Although I will not be assessing the relative merits of both sides in this dispute, I 
must briefly note that this is very much a live debate, and that the disagreements 
encountered are substantial.  I take presentism to be a more “commonsense” view than 
eternalism, but this is not a telling argument in its favor.  If everyone agreed with my 
assessment and thought that “commonsense appeal” = truth, then there would be nothing 
more to say on the matter.  This is clearly not the case.  Presentism is only an interesting 
philosophical position insofar as it is not universally accepted.  And since it is not the 
case that everyone is a presentist, there must be some other philosophically interesting 
position available.  Eternalists claim that their position fits the bill.  As such, we have a 
genuine philosophical disagreement, and it is because of this disagreement that I intend 
to evaluate presentism.  But before I do that, I must do better than merely point at  
_______________ 
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contentious groups of philosophers; I must offer some reasons for thinking I am correct.   
If the debate is legitimate, then presentism is a controversial position, and if it is a  
controversial position, then there is certainly a point in exploring the merits and demerits 
of the view. 
At first glance, it may be tempting to conflate the presentism vs. eternalism 
debate with that of the A- vs. B-theory.1  A-theorists are usually presentists, and B-
theorists are usually eternalists.  But to identify the two sets of views with each other is 
mistaken.  An A-theorist is one who regards the tenses – or A-relations – of past, 
present, and future as an irreducible part of reality.  To eliminate tensed talk from our 
discourse is to take an incomplete view of the world.  A B-theorist, on the other hand, 
sees the tenses as being human constructs to be dispensed with in favor of the B-
relations “earlier than” and “later than”.  This is a well-known debate within 
philosophical discussions on time2, but it is not the same debate as that between 
eternalism and presentism.  To see that they are distinct, it will be helpful merely to note 
that Quentin Smith (1993), though calling himself a presentist as well as an A-theorist, 
sees reality as a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, in which all entities exist, though 
the present remains distinguished.  This fact is instructive, because Smith is here 
combining portions of presentism and eternalism into an amalgam which he dubs 
‘presentism’, but which would not be so-called by most ordinary presentists.  For sake of 
simplicity, the stock presentist/A-theory view holds that (i) only the present exists, and 
(ii) the tenses are an irreducible part of reality.  The corresponding eternalist/B-theory 
position is that (iii) everything exists (with no distinction between past, present, or 
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future), and (iv) the tenses are a reducible part of reality.  Smith accepts (ii) and (iii), 
which means that he should be classified as an eternalist who yet holds to the A-theory.  
That he allots a special place to the present further complicates matters.  What is clear, 
however, is that one need not be a presentist to be an A-theorist.  Witness “growing-
block” theorists such as C.D. Broad (1959) and Michael Tooley (1997), who regard the 
present as somehow privileged – since it forms the leading edge of what currently exists 
– and yet who both hold that the past as well as the present exists.  Put differently, that 
which exists is an ever-increasing block, growing as more and more slices of existence 
become present and then past. 
A further worry is that presentists and eternalists are arguing over mere 
trivialities.3  When the presentist claims that only the present exists, it may be asked 
whether ‘exists’ is being used in a tensed or a tenseless fashion.  If it is tensed, then the 
statement is trivially true – what exists now = present – and if it is tenseless, then the 
statement is obviously false – what exists simpliciter is what exists at some time in the 
past, in the present, or at some time in the future.  Or take the eternalist statement that 
non-present times exist.  Once again, if this is uttered tenselessly, then it is trivially true, 
but if it is a tensed statement it is false.  If this is the case, then there seems to be no 
special debate arising between presentists and eternalists that cannot be settled by 
recourse to tensed vs. tenseless disputes.  But this concern can be answered as well.  In 
doing so, another analogy that will prove useful here is the well known modal debate 
between actualism and possibilism.  At various points in what follows, I will employ 
analogies between presentism and actualism on the one hand, and eternalism and 
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possibilism on the other.  If non-present times are like possible worlds, and the present 
time is like the actual world, then it becomes fairly intuitive that a number of concerns 
holding in the modal arena will also hold in the temporal one.  It is a commonplace that 
actualists and possibilists disagree over what exists simpliciter.  Actualists say that what 
exists is exhausted by what exists in the actual world, while possibilists claim the actual 
world is only a small portion of everything that exists, since unicorns and golden 
mountains exist in other possible worlds.  In this modal debate there is a genuine clash 
between those who think that existence has a narrower range (actualists) and those who 
think existence has a wider range (possibilists).  The temporal debate between presentists 
and eternalists is quite similar in this respect.  Presentists think that what exists is what is 
present, while eternalists widen the range to include past and future entities as well.  So 
long as we regard the modal disagreement as substantive, we should view the temporal 
one in the same way. 
 
2. How It Will Proceed 
With the terms of the debate clear, it is time to move on to more positive 
concerns.  I will detail the most prominent arguments against presentism, as well as 
possible presentist responses to these difficulties.  Common objections against 
presentism will be examined, amplified, and answered where appropriate.  The basic 
structure of this thesis will not attempt to be balanced in its assessments of the opposing 
views.  As I have noted earlier, I only mention the larger presentist vs. eternalist dispute 
to highlight the fact that presentism is a philosophically interesting position.  I will not 
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be concerned here to examine the arguments in favor of the presentist view.  Rather, I 
wish to describe why it is that the non-presentist4 feels compelled to deny presentism.  
To do this, it will be impossible to generate arguments of my own at every point, and 
occasional canvassing of the relevant literature will be inevitable.  In spite of this, my 
aim is to contribute something substantive to the debate wherever possible.  Although 
most of the arguments on both sides have been leveled previously, I plan to expand and 
redirect them in certain interesting and (I hope) successful ways. 
Next, my goal will be to show that although presentism survives some of the 
current objections raised against it, it does not survive them all.  Presentism is an 
interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory view.  There is a modified form of presentism 
(call it presentism*) that can meet the objections raised against the original position, and 
after noting some of the objections raised against presentism, I will sketch the outlines of 
presentism* in some detail.  I intend to show that presentism* is able to retain what is 
most valuable about presentism, while also withstanding certain objections that the latter 
view could not. 
Finally, I will discuss the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) at some length.  
STR is unique among the problems facing presentism, because it is seen to be the one 
objection that most threatens the position.5  Whereas most other objections focus on 
negative consequences that the presentist seems forced to accept, the objection from 
STR claims that the entire project of presentism is incoherent.  If this is true, the 
appropriate solution will not be to clarify certain aspects of the presentist position, but to 
renounce the view completely.  It will be my contention that the presentist need not give 
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up her view.  In fact, the nature of my solution will be compatible with a variety of 
presentist positions, which means that I will not be claiming superiority here for 
presentism*.  Rather, any type of presentist response will do. 
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II. MANY OBJECTIONS, NOT AS MANY SOLUTIONS 
 
1. Presentism Stated 
According to the presentist, no past or future things exist.  Socrates does not now 
exist, though he did in the past; if I am to have a daughter in the future, then my future 
daughter does not now exist, though she will in the future.  Ontologically, the present is 
distinct, serving to demarcate all that currently exists.  Presentism is intuitive.  In our 
everyday conversation, we think of time more or less in this fashion.  What has occurred 
in the past is now gone.  I cannot somehow get back to the event that is my eating 
breakfast yesterday morning.  No matter how I try to reenact this event – from eating the 
same food, to wearing the same clothing, and so on – I will never succeed in regaining 
that event, which is now past.  Presentism seeks to do justice to the commonsense view 
that if something exists, it can enter into various relations with other entities: it can act or 
be acted upon by another; it can be referred to, picked out, and distinguished from other 
such existent individuals.  If we reflect but a moment, we will recognize that everything 
we encounter by way of our senses is a present thing.  My desk and my computer 
presently exist as I am now sitting and typing this sentence.  I can speak to my friend, 
who is now 23 years old, though it cannot be the case now that I am speaking to this 
same individual when he is 13 years old.  Although I talked to him 10 years ago, that 
event is now past and no longer exists. 
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As noted in the introduction, presentism usually involves commitment to a tensed 
theory of time.6  On this view, tensed sentences express irreducibly primitive 
propositions about the world, such as the following: 
(1) It was the case that Socrates drank hemlock. 
(2) Dennis Kucinich will not be elected president. 
(3) It is now cloudy.  
What is distinctive about these sentences is that the utterance of each presupposes a 
particular vantage point within time.  If I utter (3) on a sunny day, my utterance will be 
false.  Had someone thought to utter (1) before the occasion of Socrates drinking 
hemlock, the utterance would have been false, and so on.  Each of sentences (1) – (3) 
must be uttered at a certain time in order for them to come out true.  Presentists regard 
tense as an integral part of the world because they think there are certain truths that are 
left out on a tenseless view of time.  For instance, the proponent of the tenseless view – 
or detenser for short – will claim that (3) can be given a tenseless reading, such as 
(4) It is cloudy on 10 June 2003. 
But according to the proponent of the tensed view – or tenser – there is something 
important that the detenser misses in substituting (4) in place of (3), namely what is 
occurring now.  One can hear an utterance of (4) and yet be unaware that it is intended as 
a paraphrase of (3), i.e. it is cloudy now, at this moment.  Someone who is unaware of 
today’s date may nevertheless be quite certain that it is cloudy today, and since this is 
true, it seems that the detenser is leaving an important fact out of her theory. 
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2.  Objections to Presentism 
There are several prominent objections leveled against presentism.  Although 
some of them can be managed more easily than others, taken together, the eternalist sees 
these difficulties as mounting a cumulative case against presentism, which in turn, favors 
the eternalist position.  (The main alternative to eternalism is presentism, and if 
presentism is shown to be an incoherent position, then eternalism wins by default.)  I 
will deal with each of these objections in turn by looking at attempted presentist 
remedies.  
 
2.1 The Incoherence of Temporal Passage 
 It is an essentially presentist notion that time be regarded as dynamic; unless time 
flows, it is difficult to understand how it is that certain events that were formerly present, 
are now past – and nonexistent – and further, how it is that certain events that were 
future – and nonexistent – are now present.  This changing from future to present, and 
from present to past implies that events move through time.  The presentist wants to 
maintain this idea of movement through time since this corresponds with our everyday 
experience.  12 June has not arrived yet, but it will do so soon.  And when 12 June 
arrives, 11 June will be past and exist no longer, having “moved” into the past from its 
position in the present.   
This idea of temporal movement is very intuitive, but there is a serious difficulty 
to be managed by those who would defend the idea of time’s passage.  As J.J.C. Smart 
(1949, 1980) and D.C. Williams (1951) point out, if time passes, one may sensibly ask 
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how fast it passes.  In order to give a coherent answer to this question, however, one will 
have to posit a hyper-time, in relation to which ordinary time flows.  But if one posits a 
hyper-time, it will be reasonable to ask how fast the hyper-time flows, and to account for 
this, one will have to appeal to a hyper-hyper-time, and so on without end.  Attempting 
to avoid this difficulty, the presentist may follow the lead suggested by Arthur Prior 
(1962: 7-8), and reply that there is no hyper-time needed, that time simply flows at a 
given rate, such as one second-per-second, but this seems unsatisfactory, as the 
attempted explanation provides what one already knows: namely, that time is flowing as 
fast as it is flowing.   
A more promising answer is that put forward by Ned Markosian (1993), in which 
he attempts to demonstrate that the rate of time’s passage need not require a hyper-time.  
To this end, he sets out the “rate of passage” argument as follows: 
(5) If it makes sense to say that time passes, then it makes sense to ask ‘How fast 
does time pass?’. 
(6) If it makes sense to ask ‘How fast does time pass?’, then it’s possible for 
there to be a coherent answer to this question.  
(7) It’s not possible for there to be a coherent answer to this question. 
_______________________________ 
(8) It doesn’t make sense to say that time passes.  (1993: 838) 
 
Markosian observes that if one asks how fast a runner is moving, one will expect to be 
given the rate of speed in terms of a clock, which serves as a stand-in for the rate of 
rotation of the earth in relation to the sun.  We in turn often think that the rate of the 
earth’s rotation with respect to the sun is our most basic measurement of the passage of 
pure time.  Markosian thinks it would be rather odd for us to ask at what rate pure time 
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passes, as this rate admits of no definition, unless we are to define pure time’s passage in 
terms of itself, claiming, for instance, that it passes at the rate of one second per second. 
What we can do is define the rate of passage of pure time in terms of less 
fundamental rates of change.  One who believes in the existence of pure time takes it to 
be the process that grounds the rate of change of all other phenomena.  Clocks are stand-
ins for the rotation of the earth around the sun, and the rotation of the earth around the 
sun is a stand-in for the passage of pure time.  Although Markosian thinks that pure time 
is an important constituent of one’s temporal views, he nevertheless acknowledges that 
one need not admit this concept into one’s ontology in order to benefit from his solution.   
So if the pure passage of time thesis is false, then all of our talk about the rates of 
different changes must be understood as talk that is meant to compare the rate of 
one ordinary change to the rate of another; a question such as ‘How fast does x 
change?’ must be a question about the speed of the change in x relative to the 
speed of some other change(s).  (1993: 841) 
 
If I take the rotation of the earth to be simply a way of measuring time, and not the 
primitive stand-in for something like pure time, I can say that someone runs at the speed 
of 10 miles per hour, or that time passes at the rate of one hour for every 10 miles 
covered by the runner.  Changes are defined in terms of each other, and that is the end of 
the story.  This approach works perfectly well in our daily activities, so there is no 
apparent reason why it should not prove equally effective in measuring time’s passage. 
Markosian’s overarching point is that the notion of a rate of change is a coherent 
one, and we can see this by looking at our everyday methods of measuring change, 
which consists in taking two rates of change – again, the constant speed of the runner, as 
well as the movement of the clock’s hands – and defining each in terms of the other.  In 
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short, Markosian denies the truth of (7) and thereby short-circuits the argument against 
time’s passage.   
 There is little for the presentist to fear from Smart’s (1949, 1980) and Williams’s 
(1951) objections, for in this case the commonsense view of time’s passage has been 
vindicated through everyday experience.  
 
2.2 Relations Between Present and Non-Present Entities 
 As the presentist’s ontology only acknowledges present entities, a rather glaring 
difficulty arises as soon as one attempts to address non-present entities.  The general 
difficulty, mentioned by Ted Sider (2001: 25-26), can be illustrated by the following: 
everyone speaks about past individuals that no longer exist, and there are assuredly 
presentists who study and admire long-deceased philosophers such as Socrates.  And if 
we speak about such past individuals, then we must be related in some way, but how is it 
possible to be related to something that does not exist? 
 The presentist has an answer to this objection, which involves an indirect relation 
between the subject and the object.  According to Markosian (forthcoming), although the 
presentist must describe the relation as being literally false (for an existent thing cannot 
be related to a non-existent thing), she may still do justice to our intuitions on the matter.  
Following Prior (1970) and Markosian (unpublished), many presentists think of time as 
being fundamentally similar to modality, while being fundamentally dissimilar to space.  
More specifically, the present is analogous to what is actual, while both past and future 
are taken to be merely possible.  The obvious consequence of this view is that presentists 
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tend to be actualists about modality, holding that only actual entities – and not mere 
possibilia – exist.  For the presentist with actualist sympathies, referring to a nonexistent 
individual such as George W. Bush’s possible son (BPS) presents exactly the same 
difficulty as referring to Socrates.  This may sound odd, as Socrates once existed and 
now does not, whereas BPS has never existed, but Markosian thinks this worry only 
holds if one chooses to disregard the rather common presentist commitment to time 
being analogous to modality.  Or, as Markosian puts it, “Given the fundamental 
similarity between time and modality, being formerly real is analogous to being possibly 
real.  And given the fundamental difference between time and space, there is no reason 
to think that being real at a remote temporal location is analogous to being real at a 
remote spatial location” (Forthcoming: 14).  Socrates does not exist, and neither does 
BPS.  
 On a Markosian-type analysis, the appropriate actualist rendering of the 
statement “I admire BPS” would primarily involve a cluster of properties – ‘being the 
son of the 46th President of the United States’ ‘being male,’ and so on – such that in 
admiring these properties, I associate them with the nonexistent entity BPS: 
(9) There are various properties, p1-pn, such that (i) I associate p1-pn with the 
name ‘BPS’, and (ii) thoughts of either p1-pn or the name ‘BPS’ evoke in me 
the characteristic feeling of admiration, and (iii) (∃x)(x has p1-pn and x is the 
referent of ‘BPS’).  (Forthcoming: 15) 
 
If we recall the fundamental analogy between time and modality, the presentist analysis 
of the statement “I admire Socrates” will run similarly to (9) above: 
(10) There are various properties, p1-pn, such that (i) I associate p1-pn with the 
name ‘Socrates’, (ii) thoughts of either p1-pn or the name ‘Socrates’ evoke 
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in me the characteristic feeling of admiration, and (iii) (∃x)(x has p1-pn 
and x is the referent of ‘Socrates’).  (Forthcoming: 15) 
 
On Markosian’s rendering, when I claim to admire Socrates, I am admiring certain 
properties associated with the deceased philosopher, such as ‘being the teacher of Plato’, 
‘being forced to drink hemlock’, and so on.  And it is these properties that not only serve 
to adequately distinguish the nonexistent individual Socrates, but also serve to connect 
him historically with me.  For instance, it is one of Socrates’ properties that he was the 
teacher of Plato.  It is also one of his properties that he was the teacher of the teacher of 
Aristotle.  And he was also the teacher of the teacher of the teacher of Alexander the 
Great.  Continuing in this way, we can connect Socrates to any number of other 
historical figures.  Presumably, if I were to enumerate enough of Socrates’ 
distinguishing properties, I could pick out a clear causal chain between him and myself. 
 This is a strange solution for the presentist to give.  It seems that in admiring an 
individual such as Socrates, one is admiring him, and not a cluster of properties that one 
takes to be associated with him.  We admire people who possess commendable traits, not 
the traits in isolation from the person exemplifying them.  Or, to put the matter 
differently, we admire courage, honesty, and other virtues, but in doing so, we are 
admiring abstract objects, and not individuals.  And our initial problem was not whether 
we could talk sensibly about virtuous properties, but whether we could talk sensibly 
about Socrates, and there seems to be no satisfactory way to do this as presentists.  
Furthermore, the eternalist is not apt to be impressed with the presentist response when a 
much simpler solution is available: as far as the eternalist is concerned, referring to 
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Socrates is as straightforward as referring to another entity that presently exists.  With no 
ontological distinction between past, present, and future, no problem arises. 
 
2.3 Singular Propositions About Non-Present Entities 
 A further difficulty goes hand-in-hand with the previous problem.  Because there 
can be no genuine relations between present entities and non-present ones, it is natural 
for the eternalist to press a related objection: if there can be no relation between present 
and non-present entities, then surely it must be equally impossible for present entities to 
express singular propositions about non-present entities.  A singular proposition must be 
expressed by a sentence that refers directly to a given individual.  For a singular 
proposition to be about a specific entity, that entity must exist when the utterance is 
made.  How, therefore, is the presentist to manage such a mundane feat as speaking 
about Socrates, or referring to him in any way, when his ontology will not allow the 
existence of any such individual?  
 Markosian (forthcoming) offers a solution that attempts to sidestep this difficulty.  
We must first distinguish between two types of meaning that a normal declarative 
sentence can have: propositional content and linguistic meaning.  The propositional 
content of a sentence is just the proposition it expresses, whereas the linguistic meaning 
of a sentence pertains to the truth conditions associated with the given sentence 
(Forthcoming: 18-19).  To clarify, one could utter the following sentence in some 
possible world w1: 
(11) Tony Blair is the Prime Minister of Great Britain. 
 16
Unbeknownst to the inhabitants of w1, however, no such individual as Tony Blair exists 
in w1, which means that although this sentence is intelligible, it does not have any 
propositional content at w1.  (11) lacks propositional content in w1 because there is no 
referent for the name ‘Tony Blair’.  (11) has a linguistic meaning, though in w1 it is 
neither true nor false, as no proposition can be uttered meaningfully about Tony Blair 
(since he does not exist in w1).  And although (11) is neither true nor false in w1, we 
know what conditions would have to prevail for (11) to be either true or false in w1, 
namely, that Tony Blair would have to exist in w1.  More clearly, for (11) to be true or 
false in w1, there would have to be an individual in w1 who possessed relevantly similar 
properties to Tony Blair in w (the actual world), such as “is British”, “is affiliated with 
the Labour Party”, “is a white male”, etc.   
 Again, it becomes important for the presentist to utilize the similarity between 
time and modality.  In a world such as w1 where Tony Blair is a mere possible entity, we 
have seen that any sentence uttered in that world which claims to refer to him will have 
no propositional content, since only actual entities can serve as referents.  The same 
situation holds in the temporal case.  What is not present is analogous to the merely 
possible, and correspondingly, what is not present cannot be the referent of an utterance.  
Now, take the sentence  
(12) Socrates was a philosopher. 
Uttered by someone at present, (12) has linguistic meaning, but no propositional content.  
(12) remains intelligible – the speaker is not uttering gibberish – but there is nothing to 
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which the utterance can refer.  More clearly, the correct truth condition for (12) seems to 
be the following, where P indicates the past-tense operator: 
(13) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff (∃x)(x is the referent of ‘Socrates’ 
and P(x is a philosopher)).  (Forthcoming: 20) 
 
We can see that (13) is the correct interpretation of (12) because when (12) is uttered, in 
order for the sentence to have any propositional content, there must now exist an 
individual picked out by the name ‘Socrates’ who was a philosopher at some point in the 
past.  But of course there is no such individual who exists now, and so it is that (12) is 
not true when uttered at the present time.  The presentist can explain why it is that we 
often take sentences like (12) to be meaningful, as these sorts of sentences have 
linguistic meaning.  But this is managed while maintaining the appropriate ontological 
commitment: only present entities exist, and since this is so, (12) can have no 
propositional content, as Socrates does not exist. 
 Once more, the eternalist is unlikely to be satisfied with this answer, and will 
hold that the presentist is going to a lot of effort to explain something that is easily and 
intuitively understood from an eternalist perspective.  The eternalist flatly accepts that 
Socrates exists, and so when she utters (12), the sentence is true without qualification.  
The distinction between propositional content and linguistic meaning is entirely 
superfluous: because Socrates exists, it is perfectly natural to predicate any number of 
things of him, and each of these attributions will simply be true or false.  Beyond this 
preference for simplicity, however, there is something strange about the proposed 
presentist solution to the problem of referring to non-present entities.  Markosian wants 
to do justice to our intuitions on the matter by granting that an utterance of (12) has some 
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sort of meaning even though it lacks propositional content.  But there is reason to think 
this attempt is unconvincing.  He notes that a sentence such as (11) is not true in w1, but 
he also states that (11) is not false in w1 either, because (11) has no propositional content 
in w1 (forthcoming: 19, n. 32).  As Markosian holds to the analogy between time and 
modality, a sentence such as (12) should be analyzed exactly as (11), that is, (12) is 
neither true nor false at the present time, since it has no propositional content now.  But 
if (12) is neither true nor false, then what sort of linguistic meaning can it have?  In order 
for a sentence to be either true or false, it must have propositional content, but if 
linguistic meaning is neither truth nor falsity, then it seems a strange stand-in for the 
ordinary, everyday conception of meaning that we readily appeal to when trying to make 
sense of a sentence such as (12).  The appropriate and consistent – though perhaps 
unappealing – presentist response seems to be that strictly there are no meaningful 
propositions about non-present entities.  This is a consistent response because it follows 
directly from the presentist’s position that there are no non-present entities.  It is 
unappealing, however, because it does not explain why so many propositions about these 
nonexistent entities are so common and so easily understood by those who hear them; 
these propositions seem to be meaningful, though the presentist is unable to say why this 
is the case.   
 
2.4 Temporal Becoming 
 A further objection against presentism is that the notion of temporal becoming is 
incoherent.  When something becomes present, from what does it become?  The 
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presentist seems to think that every passing moment, vast numbers of entities are 
popping into existence out of nothing.  Smart’s (1980) complaint is that the word 
‘becoming’ requires the existence of an entity, which in turn, becomes something.  
Intuitively, an entity must exist prior to becoming something else.  On the presentist 
picture, an entity becomes present, but it does not have a prior existence; rather, the 
moment of becoming is a different sort of becoming altogether, the moment where 
nothing becomes something, and it is this idea that Smart finds unintelligible. 
   A related argument is that put forward by Michael Rea (2003: 258-259), which 
amounts to the idea that an entity becoming something from nothing contradicts our 
everyday experience.  When a baby is born, it does not come into being out of nothing, 
but rather out of cells produced from its parents.  When mitosis occurs, cells come into 
existence, but they did not come to be from nothing, since it was the initial division of 
the parents’ cells that brought about the existence of these new cells.  Thus the 
appropriate expression describing this event would seem to be not the coming into 
existence of a baby (if by this, we mean an entity’s coming into existence out of 
nothing), but a group of cells changing from having existence in one state to having 
existence in another state.  Here again, presentism seems to be in trouble.  
 
2.5 Truthmakers 
There is a common opinion, dating back at least to Russell (1918), and defended 
more recently by D.M. Armstrong (1997) that the world must be a certain way in order 
to ground the truths of our utterances.  
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Let it be the case that particular a instantiates universal F.  a is F.  Must there not 
be something about the world that makes it to be the case, that serves as an 
ontological ground, for this truth?…We are asking what in the world will ensure, 
make true, underlie, serve as the ontological ground for, the truth that a is F.  The 
obvious candidate seems to be the state of affairs of a’s being F.  In this state of 
affairs (fact, circumstance) a and F are brought together.” (1997: 115-116)   
 
If something is said to be true, in the simplest cases, at least, then it is true in virtue of 
being about a specific entity or entities.  If I exclaim that the sky is blue, then my 
utterance will be true if, in fact, the sky is blue.  In short, our language reflects the world.  
It is fairly easy to see how a great number of statements could have truthmakers of an 
easily verifiable sort.  Truths about dogs, people, and countless other objects can be 
easily accepted so long as dogs, people, and other objects exist in the world.  But so far 
this is a rather narrow way of looking at the issue.  Statements such as “A three-legged 
dog lives next door”, “My aunt is tall”, “I am wearing a hat”, etc., are all about present 
states of affairs.  In stating what is the case now, we can check – at least in theory – the 
truths of these statements by going out in the world and seeing if the various goings-on 
match up with what we say.  What about statements concerning the past or future?  
(14) The sky was blue yesterday. 
(15) I will eat a bowl of cereal tomorrow. 
One may think of (14) and (15) differently, saying that the former is obviously true (or 
false as the case may be), but that (15) is a very different sort of statement altogether.7  
The presentist cannot endorse this intuition, however, as the past and future are exactly 
analogous, in that neither exists in any sense.  As a result, there is nothing in the 
presentist’s ontology to ground the truth of the likes of (14) and (15).  Nothing in the 
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past or future exists, so it is difficult to see how it is that the presentist can find a 
truthmaker for (14) and (15). 
  Rea (2003: 261ff) notes that this objection need not worry the presentist.  What is 
true depends on what exists, and what exists depends on what one’s ontology allows.  As 
the presentist’s ontology only countenances present entities, then it follows that – for the 
presentist, at least – true propositions are made true by what exists at present, which 
further entails that all true propositions are made true in virtue of those present entities.  
In short, the truthmaker objection has force only when one attempts to go beyond the 
bounds of one’s ontology.  If the presentist were to say that some propositions 
concerning the past or future were true or will be true, then he would be in trouble.  And 
it seems that he is in trouble, for there seem to be a great many propositions about non-
present entities that are true.  But the trouble he is in has not been brought about by 
concern over truthmakers, so much as it has arisen over the difficulties encountered in 
section 2.3 concerning reference to non-present entities.  If the presentist admits that 
there are no propositions about non-present entities, then there is a sense in which the 
truthmaker objection has been answered: what exists is what is present, and true (or 
false) propositions can only be made about what exists.  But the presentist still must 
explain why it is that many past tense and future tense propositions seem to be clearly 
true or false, and it is not clear how he can give a presentist answer to this objection.  In 
this case, the presentist answer is consistent but implausible.   
On the other hand, if the presentist claims that there are true propositions about 
non-present entities – and many people think there are – then the truthmaker objection 
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collapses into the objection we encountered in section 2.3 concerning reference to non-
present entities, and as we have seen, Markosian’s proposed solution to this problem is 
inadequate.  In both cases, the presentist is faced with a serious difficulty: first, he may 
deny that there are any meaningful propositions about non-present entities, in which 
case, presentism retains its coherence, but only at the expense of sacrificing its 
plausibility.  Second, he may acknowledge that there are meaningful propositions about 
non-present entities, but this admission requires the abandonment of presentism. 
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III. PRESENTISM* 
 
1. An Outline 
There is another response available to the presentist, provided she is willing to 
alter her views concerning non-present times.  I will call this view presentism*, and will 
spend the remainder of this chapter sketching the details of the presentist* position.   
In light of the foregoing, it will be helpful to construe time as being composed of 
atoms, which we shall refer to as metaphysical atoms, conceived along similar lines to 
Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism (1918).  On Russell’s view, we construct the world 
out of sense data.  Instead of claiming that I see an apple, I would claim to see a red 
patch of color, as well as a roughly spherical shape, to feel a certain hardness with my 
finger tips, and so on.  Out of these individual perceptions, I would construct the idea of 
an apple, though strictly, I do not perceive any such thing.  The apple is a “logical 
construction” that I create out of my more basic perceptual experiences.   
Although my view of metaphysical atoms has similarities to this brief sketch of 
Russell’s position, in certain respects it is quite different.  We do not perceive 
metaphysical atoms, though it is true that the objects of our experience are composed out 
of them.  I will return to task of explaining just what metaphysical atoms are, but for 
now, this cursory statement will suffice to give a flavor for what follows.   
The future continues to be unlike the past and the present, and we can persist in 
saying that it is nothing, so long as we understand this to mean that there is nothing in 
the future which is determinate.  The future is an as-yet-undetermined, boundless 
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expanse of metaphysical atoms.  Our language requires determinate entities and events 
for referents, and the future contains none of these, which leaves the future open in the 
desired fashion.  
These metaphysical atoms are simples that neither come into, nor go out of, 
existence.  Rather, they are eternal.  This is somewhat analogous to the parents who 
conceive a child.  Although the child is composed of a new combination of cells, there is 
no new matter that has come into being with its birth.  The world contains matter, and 
this matter gets recombined in a multiplicity of ways, resulting in new entities.  The 
analogy only goes so far, however, as there is no distinction between metaphysical atoms 
and physical atoms: physical atoms are just instantaneous collections of metaphysical 
atoms which coalesce at the present moment.  At this point, the presentist might become 
suspicious of presentism*.  The presentist is committed to the nonexistence of all non-
present entities, but it appears as though presentism* violates this commitment by 
postulating the existence of a future populated with metaphysical atoms.  In response, it 
is true that if the presentist is committed to denying the existence of any future entity, 
then she will not be able to accept presentism*.  But I take it that what is valuable about 
presentism is that it leaves the future indeterminate, and this is something that 
presentism* preserves.   
There are no physical entities populating the future, no determinate individuals 
which may be the subjects of our linguistic utterances.  So although metaphysical atoms 
are identical with physical atoms, this identity relation only holds at the present moment, 
which means that the future does not contain a world full of physical beings, as desired.8  
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When these metaphysical atoms exist as future entities, they are indeterminate, having 
no shape or definite grouping, which would enable them to be the referents of our 
language.  When they reach the present moment, they form discrete units, combining in 
such a way as to form the physical atoms that constitute present entities.  Proceeding 
beyond the present and into the past, these atoms thereafter cease to retain the distinct 
form they received during the present, and this ontological degeneration occurs at every 
moment. The present is filled with instantaneous temporal “slices” of every present 
entity.  With every passing moment, the temporal flow of metaphysical atoms combine 
at the present moment in a multiplicity of ways and at a multiplicity of places.  These 
atoms then disassemble immediately thereafter, which leaves them in a similar state as 
when they were future entities – existent though scattered and disparate.  But now a 
further difficulty arises: how can we fix reference to the metaphysical atoms once they 
cease to be the entities, physical and otherwise, to which we are able to refer?  If this 
solution is to be a presentist solution, then it should remedy the inherent presentist 
deficiency of being unable to refer to non-present entities, while simultaneously 
acknowledging the essential presentist doctrine that the only existent entities are present 
entities.   
To answer, it is first necessary to point out that on the presentist* view, there are 
no continuants.  The "entity" that was Socrates was nothing more than a fiction, invented 
by us for convenience.  To take a more recent example, “I” am a collection of temporal 
slices, and although, strictly, only one temporal slice exists at every passing moment, 
there seems to be a strong continuity between past slices and the present slice.  At every 
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passing moment, there is a temporal slice that exhibits the property of being ‘Brannon-
like’, which is relevantly similar to preceding temporal slices such that we have some 
justification in calling the collection of those slices ‘Brannon’.  To be clear, there is no 
collection of temporal slices (since only the present slice exists), and there is no 
ontological entity that is “I” (if by ‘I’ it is meant an entity that persists over time), and 
yet it is very convenient to think of previously-existent Brannon-like slices as 
constituting some temporally composite entity, and we take this to be what is referred to 
by the expression “I”.  So the problem of referring to Socrates is very similar to the 
problem of referring to me: strictly, there was never any entity named Socrates, though 
there were temporal slices that had Socrates-like properties.  Now, when there are no 
present Socrates-like temporal slices, we cannot refer to the entity “Socrates”, but then 
again, no one could have referred to “Socrates” even when such Socrates-like slices 
were present.  Instead, what could have been said was that metaphysical atoms 
continually coalesced into instantaneous Socrates-like slices.   
Forming into distinct entities at the point of the present, the formerly indefinite 
metaphysical atoms become the collection of physical atoms – which, in turn, are 
nothing but logical constructs – of property exemplification.  Note that the transition 
from indeterminate metaphysical atoms to distinct physical atoms occurs simultaneously 
with the latter’s property exemplification.  There is not yet an instance when there exists 
a distinct grouping of physical atoms without a correspondingly exemplified property (or 
set of properties).  When an entity becomes past, however, a situation arises which is 
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analogous to that which held for the future, namely that our physical atoms have now 
reverted to the formless, indeterminate entities that once populated the future.  
It is fairly common for presentists to use the sentential tense operators ‘P’ and 
‘F’, which are used to pick out past and future times without incurring any added 
ontological cost.  According to the presentist, the appropriate analysis of the sentence 
‘Socrates is a philosopher’ is the following:  
(16) P(Socrates is a philosopher).   
Due to the scope of the tense operator, the presentist is not committed to saying that 
Socrates exists.  Rather, the sentence simply expresses the idea that at some time in the 
past, there exists an individual designated by the name ‘Socrates’, who is a philosopher, 
is the teacher of Plato, and so on.  Again drawing on the analogy between time and 
modality, the presentist (temporal) analysis seen in (16) will be similar to the actualist 
(modal) interpretation of the sentence ‘Possibly, my daughter exists’: 
(17) ◊(my daughter exists). 
In the same way that the actualist is not committed to the actual existence of my possible 
daughter, the presentist is not committed to the existence of Socrates.  (17) states that in 
some possible world, my daughter exists, just as (16) states that at some past time, 
Socrates exists and is a philosopher.  Keeping with the analogy between time and 
modality, the presentist can regard all non-present times in the same fashion as the 
actualist regards non-actual worlds.  Just as the actualist denies the existence of my 
daughter (since she is a possible entity), so the presentist denies the existence of Socrates 
(since he is a non-present entity).  
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 It is important to remember that Socrates does not now exist in any sense.   
Presentists acknowledge that there are, in fact, certain differences between past and 
future.  Causal chains, for instance, run from the past to the future, and not vice versa.  
There is an acknowledged need to be able to refer to Socrates, whereas the same cannot 
be said of supposed future entities.  Reference to past entities is an important part of 
everyday discourse in a way that reference to future entities is not.  Speaking about 
Socrates, everyone (or most everyone) will know that I am referring to a distinct 
individual, one of the most well known philosophers in history.  If I refer to my future 
grandchild, my audience will understand that I have stipulated something about what 
may or may not be the case at some point in the future, referred to an individual who 
does not now exist, and may not ever exist.  
 
2. The Motivation Behind Presentism* 
 There are some clear benefits to accepting presentism* in place of presentism.  
First, the presentist* may still utilize Markosian’s (1993) defense of temporal passage.  
Presentism* is a dynamic account of time in which certain entities (metaphysical atoms) 
are continually flowing past the point of the present, where they become temporal slices, 
only to collapse back into their previous state once the present moment is passed.  
Markosian’s defense of presentism applies equally well in this case to presentism*. 
 Presentism struggled to explain how it is that present and non-present entities can 
be related when the latter type of entities do not exist.  For instance, Markosian 
(forthcoming) suggests that we can stand in the “admiring” relation with Socrates’ 
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defining properties, but this has been shown to be unsatisfactory.  We admire the entity 
that is Socrates, and not certain abstract properties in isolation from the individual that is 
Socrates. 
 This problem is ineffective against presentism*, because strictly, there are no 
entities, whether past, present, or future.  At present, there is a temporal Brannon-like 
slice, but there is no Socrates-like slice.  I do not stand in any relation to Socrates, 
because neither “I” nor “he” exists.  Furthermore, the present Brannon-like slice cannot 
stand in any relation (such as admiration, love, hate, etc.) with any other slice because 
slices are not the sorts of things that can express admiration, or be deserving of 
admiration.  There must be “whole” persons to do such things, and as I have made clear, 
there are none of these. 
 We have seen that another difficulty for presentism is that there seems to be no 
way to explain the possibility of singular propositions about non-present objects.  
Markosian (forthcoming) suggests that we can analyze such propositions as being 
meaningful without being true or false, yet this seems incoherent.  In talking about 
Socrates, we want to say that what we are saying is meaningful because it is at least 
possible to say whether it is true or false. 
 With presentism*, the matter is different.  We can dispense altogether with 
singular propositions about individuals such as Socrates, while yet being able to give an 
analysis of how such talk seems to be possible.  So instead of saying 
(18) Socrates is a philosopher 
we can analyze (18) as follows: 
 30
(19) P(∀x1, …, ∀xn)(∃xn)((x1 is the referent of a Socrates-like temporal slice 
& x1 is a philosopher-like temporal slice) & (x2 is the referent of a 
Socrates-like temporal slice & x2 is a philosopher-like temporal slice) & 
… & (xn is the referent of a Socrates-like temporal slice & xn is a 
philosopher-like temporal slice)). 
(19) states that if what is wanted is the “entity” that is Socrates, one must pull together 
all the temporal slices that are sufficiently Socrates-like, for this is the only way to 
“construct” anything like the person we take to be Socrates.  In doing this, (19) does not 
commit one to the existence of any Socrates-like temporal slice, let alone the “whole 
person” of Socrates.  (19) simply says that if, for sake of convenience, one would like to 
talk of Socrates (as in (18)), then there is a coherent way to analyze such talk into the 
ontologically harmless (19).  Of course, the presentist* position does not acknowledge 
the existence of “whole” entities at all, so there cannot be singular propositions about 
these sorts of things.  But as I noted earlier, it is convenient to talk as though collections 
of temporal slices are identical with the entities of our everyday experience, and in 
keeping with this convenient fiction, there is a way to analyze such talk. 
 The problem of temporal becoming is simply a difficulty that presentism cannot 
explain away; at the moment of the present, entities come into existence out of nothing.  
This would not be a problem if certain new entities came into existence from out of other 
entities, but the fact of present entities becoming something from nothing is a built-in 
feature of the presentist view.  
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 It should be obvious at this point why presentism* avoids these complications.  
There is a straightforward way in which some things (indeterminate metaphysical atoms) 
become other things (determinate temporal slices) at the point of the present.  With this 
solution, the word ‘become’ is used in the standard fashion, and we observe the world 
behaving as we would ordinarily expect it to, with certain micro-sized entities 
rearranging to form certain other macro-sized entities. 
 Lastly, we come to the truthmaker objection.  We have seen previously that this 
objection places the presentist in a dilemma: either admit that there are past and future 
truths, or else deny that there are any such things.  If the presentist chooses the former 
option, then he has answered the truthmaker objection (true propositions can be made 
about present, as well as non-present entities), but his view loses its coherence, since it is 
no longer the presentist view that he is defending.  If the presentist chooses the latter 
option, then he has still answered the truthmaker objection (but now, true propositions 
can only be made about present entities), though his view suffers from a certain 
implausibility, since it seems that we can make these sorts of propositions about non-
present entities.  (In talking about Socrates, other people understand what I am saying.)  
Clearly, neither of these options is very appealing.   
 As before, there is a presentist* solution that can be given to the truthmaker 
objection.  In order to ground truths about present entities, we must again appeal to 
convenience, and insist that there are “collections” of temporal slices, such that we can 
refer to these collections as distinct individuals.  There really are no such things, but if 
we want to talk about persons, objects, or any other sort of individual thing, this is the 
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sort of analysis we have to give of the matter.  But if we take this approach to the 
problem, then this presentist* “solution” is even less satisfactory than the presentist 
responses that I have already dismissed: we have illicitly gathered together a particular 
group of temporal slices so as to create a whole entity, but we now find that there is 
nothing to ground the truth or falsehood of any proposition made about such an 
individual.  For example, assume we “create” a desk out of a large number of temporal 
desk-like slices.  If we make a proposition about this “desk”, there is no set of 
circumstances obtaining in the world such that we can point to it, saying “There is a 
desk”, since all that we could be referring to would be instantaneous desk-like temporal 
slices.  And since we can only refer to these slices one at a time, there is nothing 
substantial enough existing in the world to ground our propositions about the desk.   
 I prefer a different solution to this problem.  The truthmaker objection has 
obvious parallels to the “singular propositions about non-present entities” objection.  If 
past and future entities exist, then these things will ground the truth or falsity of our 
statements concerning them, and if they do not exist, then our talk about them will be 
ungrounded.  In a similar fashion, if such non-present individuals exist, then it is much 
easier to explain how we could make singular propositions about them.  Likewise, if 
they do not exist in any sense, then such propositions seem to be impossible.   
With this similarity apparent, I will proceed by denying that there are singular 
propositions about non-present entities.  My obvious reason for doing this is that there is 
nothing to ground the truth of such propositions.  Socrates does not exist, so there is 
nothing to make my propositions about him true or false.  And since I deny that Socrates 
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exists in any sense, it is also easy to see why I am denying that there can be any singular 
propositions about him.  If I did not deny this possibility, then I would have to explain 
why it is that I can refer to an entity when there is nothing grounding the truth of such a 
reference.  Singular propositions about Socrates (or any other past or future individual) 
are impossible, but I can still explain why it is that such propositions seem to be 
possible, and why such propositions seem to be meaningful when they are uttered.  My 
solution here proceeds exactly as with the solution to the problem of singular 
propositions about non-present entities, with (19) above serving as the appropriate 
paraphrase of this phenomenon. 
 I think the case for accepting presentism* is compelling.  There are several 
difficulties that presentism cannot adequately answer.  Presentism* comes with a 
definite ontological cost, in that it must acknowledge the existence of a certain sort of 
non-present entity, while denying the existence of present “entities” generally (as these 
are normally understood), but I think this cost is outweighed by the solutions it provides. 
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IV. THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 
 
1. Exposition of the Theory 
 What is generally taken to be the most telling objection against presentism – and 
this would include my hybrid presentist* view – arises, not from strictly philosophical 
considerations, but from physics.  As implied by its name, presentism requires an 
ontologically distinguished present.  For the presentist, it would be odd to claim that 
what is present (i.e. what exists) for one individual is not present for another.  But this is 
exactly what the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) seems to require, for according to 
STR, what cannot be had is anything like a distinguished present.  Rather, what is 
present is entirely dependent upon one’s frame of reference, and STR does not recognize 
privileged reference frames.  This will be the heart of the objection against presentism 
from STR.  First, however, let us see in some detail what motivates STR, and what 
practical consequences can be drawn from it.  In this fashion, we will be able to see more 
clearly why it is that presentism runs afoul of STR. 
To begin, it is helpful to think of a reference frame (or coordinate system) as a 
“point of view” from which a theoretical observer is able to examine the occurrence of 
events.  Further, no one reference frame is privileged with respect to any other frame, as 
all such frames are in motion relative to each other.  For example, from our vantage 
point as humans, it is rather common to measure physical movement with respect to the 
earth, if for no other reason than that most of us spend our entire lives inhabiting this 
particular planet.  When concerns over STR are not especially pressing, it is easy – 
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though incorrect – to think of the earth as being the proper viewpoint from which to 
judge the behavior of all physical phenomena whatever, be it motion, distance, or as we 
will see later, existence.  When one sees a plane flying at the speed of sound, one does 
not usually consider that the earth itself is hurtling through space at a tremendously 
greater rate of speed than that at which the plane is flying.  It is simply very convenient – 
and not incorrect – to judge the behavior of proximate physical occurrences with respect 
to the earth.  But in so doing, it is important to remember that the earth itself is in motion 
relative to an even larger point of reference, such as one would have on the sun.  And 
this is an important point at which STR breaks from classical mechanics.  On the 
classical view, it was thought that space and time were absolute, that there was an 
ultimate frame of reference according to which all the physical incidents of the universe 
could be accounted for.  Due to major developments in physics at the turn of the 20th 
century, we now know that the classical notion of an absolute frame of reference is 
inaccurate.  Instead, there are infinitely many potential reference frames from which to 
observe physical occurrences, and these occurrences are always occurrences according 
to a particular reference frame. 
 On the classical view of physics, distances and durations were invariant across all 
inertial frames of reference, but this is not the case with STR.9  STR relies upon a four-
dimensional spacetime manifold, in which the coordinates of a given point are 
represented in the following manner, x, y, z, t, where t (time) is to be regarded just like 
the three spatial dimensions x, y, z.  On the classical way of looking at things, the 
physical entities were thought to exist in space and through time, so that the spatial 
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location of a given entity was distinct from its location in time.  On the four-dimensional 
view, the matter is greatly simplified, as the element of time just picks out one more 
coordinate (in addition to the three spatial coordinates) allowing for even greater 
precision in locating events within spacetime.  Part of the motivation for developing the 
notion of the four-dimensional manifold is that the notions of space and time are always 
inextricably linked.  As H. Minkowski noted, “The objects of our perception invariably 
include places and times in combination.  Nobody has ever noticed a place except at a 
time, or a time except at a place” (1908: 76).  Events in spacetime are separated by 
intervals, or combinations of distance and duration.  Thus, on the spatiotemporal view, 
one might describe two neighboring points, A and B, by saying that A’s spatiotemporal 
location is x, y, z, t, and B’s is x’, y’, z’, t’, where these two sets of coordinates describe 
two distinct locations that are as close as one may wish to stipulate (since there are 
indefinitely many points that one can designate with the coordinates x’, y’, z’, t’, such 
that they will be in the immediate proximity of x, y, z, t).  
We are now in a position to state the central thesis of STR: physical laws and the 
speed of light remain constant in every inertial reference frame (where an inertial frame 
is one that is unaccelerated, that is maintaining a constant velocity).  This notion can be 
clarified by the following widely referenced example from Einstein (1961).  Imagine one 
is among a group of passengers traveling on a rather long train moving east at a constant 
velocity v.  It will be appropriate for the moving passengers to regard the train as their 
primary reference frame.  Further, we will label a point on the last car of the train A’, and 
a point on the first car of the train B’, such that if one took a snapshot of the train as a 
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whole, A’ would be the westernmost part of the train, while B’ would be the easternmost 
part.  In addition, A’ and B’ will be equidistant from the mid-point of the train M’.  We 
can also easily imagine a length of embankment along the railroad tracks that 
corresponds exactly with the length of the train, such that, at a given instant, points A, M, 
and B along the track will line up with A’, M’, and B’ of the train.  If, relative to M, 
lightning strikes simultaneously at A and B, then since the speed of light remains 
constant within a given inertial frame, it will be the case that rays of light from both A 
and B will reach M simultaneously.  But notice that, even though points A’, M’, and B’ 
correspond appropriately with A, M, and B at the time of the lightning strike, it will not 
be the case that the lightning strikes will appear to be simultaneous to the observers 
riding the train.  This result arises due to the fact that the train is traveling east, and 
hence, towards the lightning strike occurring at B, and away from the strike occurring at 
A.  This fact entails that the light ray emitted from site B will reach the train’s passengers 
slightly sooner than the light emitted from site A.  The consequence is that such notions 
as simultaneity only have sense in relation to a specific reference frame.  What is 
simultaneous to observers in one reference frame will not necessarily be simultaneous to 
observers situated in another frame.  “Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its 
own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of 
time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event.” (1961: 31)  The 
notion of time, as of simultaneity, only has meaning relative to a specific reference 
frame. 
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2. Why STR Poses a Problem for Presentism 
 It is here that the difficulty for presentism10 becomes glaring.  If our best physical 
theories entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity – or of absolute time in 
general – then the presentist finds herself in an embarrassing position.  She maintains 
that what exists is what is present, and it is eminently desirable that existence should not 
be relative, but that it be invariant across reference frames.  (It would be odd for two 
observers A and B, both of whom share different reference frames, to emphatically 
declare that the other does not exist.)  Yet, if STR is correct this cannot be.  It is simply 
not the case that the notion of the present will be the same for distinct reference frames.  
As seen in the train example, where observers at one reference frame observe the 
occurrence of a given event at a given time t, it will not be the case that observers in 
another frame observe the same occurrence at t, but rather at some earlier moment t - 1  
or at some later moment t + 1, as the case may be.  Of course, given the speed at which 
light travels, in most instances involving observers in distinct reference frames – such as 
the train example – the lack of simultaneity across frames will be so slight as to be 
practically imperceptible.  But the difficulty remains that strictly, the relation of 
simultaneity does not extend across reference frames, which means that the notion of an 
absolute present, which is so crucial for the presentist position, is incoherent.  For if 
there is no absolute present, then there is no privileged ontological class of entities 
enjoying existence.  Put more perspicuously, the argument from STR against presentism 
can be set out as follows: 
(20) STR is true.  (Premise) 
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(21) According to STR, there is no such thing as a privileged reference frame.  
(Premise) 
(22) According to STR, the notion of simultaneity is only coherent relative to 
a specific reference frame.  (Premise) 
(23) The notion of absolute simultaneity is incoherent.  (From 20, 21, 22) 
(24) Presentism requires the notion of absolute simultaneity.  (Premise) 
_________________________________________ 
(25) Presentism is false.  (From 23, 24) 
 
3. Presentist Responses to STR 
One response, taken by Mark Hinchliff (2000), has been to acknowledge that 
STR poses difficulties for presentism, and that therefore the philosophy must be adapted 
to fit the physics.  To this end, Hinchliff elaborates two views, ‘point presentism’, and 
‘cone presentism’, each of which amounts to a denial of (24).  (It is worthwhile to note 
that Hinchliff eventually abandons point presentism, while endorsing cone presentism.)  
In brief, point presentism is best described as “spatiotemporal solipsism”, in that nothing 
exists except what exists here-and-now.  It might seem that the location of ‘here-and-
now’ is to be determined by the spatiotemporal location of the individual espousing the 
view, but this is false.  Point presentism requires that only a single point of spacetime 
exists.  For if the spatiotemporal location of the utterance distinguishes what point exists 
from what does not, the point presentist would have to acknowledge that there are 
multiple points in spacetime that are real, but from the vantage point of any one of them, 
the others are not real.11   
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In our pre-relativity way of viewing the world, we distinguish between space and 
time.  Presentism, on this view, is strictly about time, and has nothing to do with space.  
On this way of seeing the matter, the only things that exist are those that exist now.  But 
once we familiarize ourselves with STR, we come to understand that the notion of time 
cannot be separated from that of space, which means that if we hope to maintain 
presentism in spatiotemporal terms, we must modify our ontology so that what exists is 
what exists now (at this time), as well as what exists here (at this place).  Hence, we see 
the motivation for point presentism.   
Alluding to point presentism’s solipsistic character, as well as what he takes to be 
its general lack of appeal (S580), Hinchliff settles on cone presentism, which entails that 
an event E’s present will consist of E, as well as E’s past light cone – which are all the 
events in E’s absolute past.  It is worth remarking here that although the notion of 
absolute simultaneity is not well defined in the Minkowskian four-dimensional manifold, 
three other notions are so defined.12  In relation to any given point p, it is possible to 
define, relative to p, the absolute future of p, the absolute past of p, and those spacetime 
points that are spacelike separated from p.  The set of points in p’s absolute future are 
those that can be reached from p by a signal traveling at or below the speed of light.  The 
set of points q in p’s absolute past are those from which p may be reached by a signal 
emitted at q traveling at or below the speed of light.  Finally, the points spacelike 
separated from p are those that cannot be connected to p by any signal traveling at or 
below the speed of light.  For any set of points A, if A is neither in p’s absolute future nor 
in p’s absolute past, then A is spacelike separated from p.  The result of this is that 
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although absolute simultaneity is not well defined on the Minkowskian view, it is well 
defined that certain spacetime points may be reached from other spacetime points by 
signals traveling at or below the speed of light.  So when Hinchliff picks out an event E, 
as well as all the events in E’s absolute past, he is taking advantage of an intrinsic 
feature of Minkowskian spacetime.  For any event E, there will be a well-defined set of 
points that constitute E’s absolute past, but it is important to remember that this past is 
only absolute relative to E; there may be another point F, such that F’s absolute past 
contains spacetime points found in E’s absolute future. 
Another common presentist response has been either to attack (20) or to deny 
that STR has anything to do with the philosophical issue of time.  In this vein, authors 
such as Prior (1970), William Craig (1990), and Markosian (forthcoming) have rejected 
(20) on the grounds that STR draws extravagant metaphysical conclusions from strictly 
epistemological premises – namely, that an absolute reference frame does not exist 
because we have no empirical method of verifying whether this is so or not.  The role of 
science is to observe and draw conclusions from observable phenomena, but to the 
extent that the conclusions exceed the scope of what is observable, science has thereby 
overstepped its bounds.  It is empirically verifiable that the speed of light remains 
invariant across inertial reference frames.  It is also recognized that there is no way of 
empirically verifying the existence of a privileged reference frame.  But it does not 
thereby follow that there is no such thing as a privileged reference frame.  In short, the 
roots of STR are thoroughly verificationist, and as verificationism has been widely 
acknowledged to be an incoherent philosophical view, STR should likewise be 
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abandoned as a philosophical view, or at the very least, the claims of STR should be 
reined in so that the possibility of absolute time is left open. 
 
3.1 Point Presentism and Cone Presentism 
How do these attempted presentist solutions fare?  I will begin with Hinchliff’s 
two proposals.  For starters, Hinchliff (2000: S579) sees an argument offered by Hilary 
Putnam (1967) as being persuasive against point presentism.  Putnam’s objection 
amounts to the following: there exist events that are past which were never present.  It is 
possible that there be a series of events X that was spacelike separated from some earlier 
events Y on my “world line” – where ‘world line’ is just an illustrative way of picking 
out the series of four-dimensional points that constitute my spatiotemporal location over 
the course of my life – which means that this event was never present for me.  And yet, it 
is possible that X is now timelike separated from me, i.e. in my absolute past, which 
further means that it is possible for X to be in my past without ever having been in my 
present (1967: 246).  This would be an admittedly odd result, but it is not clear how this 
is relevant to the point presentist position, for the point presentist does not recognize 
anything like past or future events.  Putnam’s objection requires that the point presentist 
acknowledge the existence of an absolute past for a given point p, but this is exactly 
what the point presentist denies.  As it stands, there is one existent spatiotemporal point, 
while everything else is nonexistent.   There is simply the here-now, and to say that there 
exists a past event that was never present is nonsensical on this view because no past 
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events exist in any sense.  The intuitive idea of moving from present to past, which this 
objection assumes, is precisely what the point presentist denies.   
This argument against point presentism falters because the point presentist will 
not acknowledge that there is anything to point to which answers to the name of ‘past 
event’.  Although this objection is irrelevant against point presentism, I see this 
irrelevance as being due to a misinterpretation by Hinchliff, and not a mistake on 
Putnam’s part.  The proper target for this objection is Hinchliff’s cone presentism, which 
I will discuss momentarily.   
A more telling line of attack is developed by Sider (2001: 45-47), who protests 
that a single spatiotemporal point is not substantial enough to accommodate all that 
exists.  For instance, where a given spatiotemporal region can contain infinitely many 
spacetime points, it seems implausible that even a single person could occupy just one of 
these single points.  But a single point is all that the point presentist can allow.  (As we 
have seen, there are three well defined sets of spatiotemporal points for any given point 
p: those in p’s absolute past; those in p’s absolute future; those spacelike separated from 
p.  Point presentism is the clearest analogue to pre-relativity, or “ordinary” presentism.  
Ordinary presentism requires that only the present time exists, and since point 
presentism seeks to take the spatiotemporal manifold into account – where space and 
time are no longer distinct – it must maintain that only the one spatiotemporal point 
exists.  To claim that points in p’s absolute past or absolute future exist would be to 
depart radically from the ordinary presentist motivation.)   
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Again, the spatiotemporal solipsism that this view entails cannot accommodate 
the single entity whose existence is needed to anchor the solipsistic element of the view.  
Solipsism requires that one individual exist while nothing else does, but on the point 
presentist view, there is not even enough “room” for the single individual.  As if this 
were not enough, the initial plausibility that motivated presentism – that only the present 
time exists – is lost when presentism is transformed into point presentism.  Ordinary 
presentism allows for the existence of a large number of entities; so long as the entities 
in question are present entities, nothing is to be excluded.  But, owing to the structure of 
the four-dimensional manifold, the point presentist can neither regard time and space as 
distinct, nor can she acknowledge an absolute simultaneity relation extending across 
reference frames.  This means that only one spatiotemporal point has existence.  
However objectionable the idea of only present times existing may be, this ordinary 
presentist position does not imply the solipsism of point presentism, as ordinary 
presentism allows for the existence of other entities, so long as they exist at the present 
time.  I take these arguments to be decisive against the point presentist position.  What is 
gained – and I am unsure about what exactly this would be – is far outweighed by what 
is lost on this view. 
Initially at least, cone presentism seems to fare much better.  As noted above, this 
view entails that an event E’s present will consist of E, as well as all the events in E’s 
absolute past.  According to Hinchliff (2000), there are three distinct advantages to the 
cone presentist position.  “One virtue of the view is that it captures the idea that what is 
present is what I am seeing now.  A second virtue is that it identifies the present with an 
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invariant feature of the special theory.  A third virtue is that we are not alone.”  (S580)  
As far as the first virtue, it is worth having because many things we see, such as certain 
distant stars and planets, are strictly in our past here on earth.  To see why this is so, one 
must simply note that the light signal traveling from them to us takes time, and 
necessarily these distant places existed prior to our reception of the light signal traveling 
from their spatiotemporal location to ours.  The second virtue has to do with the 
structure of the view in question.  A point in cone presentism’s favor is that the 
framework posited – the past light cone of E – is a recognized and well-defined element 
of any spatiotemporal point E in the Minkowski manifold, and not something smuggled 
in out of purely presentist concerns.  As for the third virtue, this is an advantage that 
cone presentism possesses over the earlier – and abandoned – point presentist view.  
Where the latter is thoroughly solipsistic, the former allows for the existence of other 
entities.   
There are two arguments raised by Steven Savitt (2000), which are in turn 
countered by Hinchliff (2000).  Savitt thinks the cone presentist should be concerned 
about the status of events in an observer E’s absolute past.  According to this position, 
E’s present includes events that are now in E’s past, which seems an odd line for a 
presentist to adopt.  For example, if the collapse of a distant star is calculated to have 
occurred 20 million years ago, then it follows that on the cone presentist view, this rather 
distant event is now present.  Hinchliff sees this objection as misguided, since the notion 
of ‘occurring 20 million years ago’ must come from outside STR, and is therefore not 
valid.  For there to be anything like a fact of the matter concerning the time of an event’s 
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occurrence, there must also be a distinguished reference frame, and this is precisely what 
STR does not allow.  The objection fails because it is inconsistent.  If Savitt wanted to 
allow for the existence of a privileged reference frame, then there would be no need to 
postulate cone presentism, when plain old, pre-relativistic presentism would suffice.  
And if Savitt wishes to maintain his position that there is no such thing as a privileged 
reference frame, then he must acknowledge that there is no way of measuring how long 
ago a seemingly past event occurred.  In either case, presentism – either in its ordinary or 
variant form – survives. 
Savitt’s second point of contention is that it seems arbitrary for a cone presentist 
to only allow for E’s past light cone.  Why not admit E’s future light cone as well? 
[Cone presentism] seems to rest on the idea that events on the past light cone of 
E have a lightlike separation from E and hence the spacetime interval from E to 
(say) E’ (on the past light cone of E) is 0.  But then it seems arbitrary to exclude 
from the present events on the future light cone of E, which also are lightlike 
separated from E.  It is hard to see, then, why the Big Crunch or the endless heat 
death of the universe should be excluded from the present…it does seem 
desperate to define presentism in such a way that events virtually at the origin of 
our universe or in the remote future are included in the present.  (2000: S566-
S567) 
 
In part, this objection is merely an extension of the previous one.  Savitt thinks it odd 
that spatiotemporally distant events – whether past or future – should be counted among 
what presently exists.  But a further point is that presentism – if it is to regard past and 
future as being symmetrical with respect to the present – should hold that the past and 
future are both nonexistent.  What could make the past light cone of E privileged in such 
a way that would not hold also for E’s future light cone?  Hinchliff responds that the 
difference is not arbitrary, and this is so for two reasons.  First, the set of points in E’s 
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past light cone are those from which a light signal could be sent to E, whereas the set of 
points in E’s future light cone are those to which a light signal can be sent from E.  So 
there is an asymmetry built into the spatiotemporal framework itself.  Second, this 
asymmetry occurs as a result of the peculiar nature of causation, which extends from 
past to future, and not vice versa.  The distinction between the past and future light cones 
is far from arbitrary. 
 I must now mention the relevance of Putnam’s (1967) earlier argument.  I noted 
that Hinchliff misinterpreted it to be directed against point presentism, but as I showed 
above, it is completely beside the point when leveled against that position.  Rather, it is a 
reasonable argument to make against cone presentism.  Here it seems appropriate to 
quote the relevant passage in full: 
 …I might attempt saying that statements about events that are in neither the 
upper half nor the lower half of my light-cone have no truth value.  In addition, 
statements about events in the upper half of my light-cone have no truth value, 
since they are in my future according to every coordinate system.  So only 
statements about events in the lower half of my light cone have a truth value; 
only events that are in “my past” according to all observers are determined. 
  
 This last move, however, flagrantly violates the idea that there are no Privileged 
Observers.  Why should a statement’s having or not having a truth value depend 
upon the relation of the events referred to in the statement to just one special 
human being, me?  Moreover, the following highly undesirable consequence 
flows from this last view: let Oscar be a person whose whole world-line is 
outside of the light-cone of me-now.  Le me-future be a future “stage” of me 
such that Oscar is in the lower half of the light-cone of me-future.  Then, when 
that future becomes the present, it will become true that Oscar existed, although it 
will never have had a truth value to say in the present tense “Oscar exists now.”  
Things could come to have been, without its ever having been true that they are!  
(1967: 245-246) 
 
It seems clear that these remarks should be understood as objections to cone presentism, 
which is indicated by Putnam’s statement that “only events in the lower half of my light 
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cone have a truth value; only events that are in ‘my past’ according to all observers are 
determined”.  And the fact that statements in “my past” are regarded to be so by all 
observers whatsoever corresponds as well with the fact that for any event E, there will be 
an absolute past – E’s past light cone – for E, which means that regardless of one’s 
reference frame, it will be the case that E’s absolute past remains constant.   
 In light of Putnam’s objection, how does cone presentism fare?  It can survive 
unscathed, but only at a substantial cost.  The cone presentist position escapes because 
Hinchliff does not acknowledge E’s past light cone as being genuinely past.  Rather, it is 
something like an enlarged present.  Putnam sees E’s past light cone as being E’s 
absolute past, and although Hinchliff admits this as well, it is not clear what he means by 
this.  For instance, he takes pains to distinguish his own position from that of Tooley 
(1997), when he says that Tooley’s position is not presentism, as it regards the past and 
present as being equally real (2000: S585).  Furthermore, the only way Hinchliff avoids 
Savitt’s (2000) first objection – that seemingly distant past events are now present – is to 
deny that those past events are genuinely past.  The rather odd result is that Hinchliff’s 
view is very like Tooley’s, except that whereas Tooley admits the existence of both past 
and present, he distinguishes between them, while Hinchliff accepts what one would 
normally think of as past and present, but lumps them both together into a gigantic 
present.  Now it is easy to see why Putnam’s objection – though appropriately directed at 
cone presentism – proves ineffective.  Putnam sees cone presentism as admitting a 
genuine past as well as a present, and his complaint depends on this because the 
problematic result is that entities can become past without ever having been present.  
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Hinchliff’s solution is to deny that the past light cone of E is really past, and where there 
is no past there is no problem of past entities never having been present.  Once an entity 
is present it remains so, never becoming past.   
Although cone presentism seems to survive Putnam’s argument, it has been 
transformed into something scarcely recognizable as presentism.  Presentism began as a 
rather intuitive view, claiming that the only existent things are present things, while yet 
acknowledging that these things can become past, and thereby cease to exist.  Cone 
presentism, on the other hand, acknowledges that the future is nothing at all, but instead 
enlarges the present, so that what was once regarded as the past is now absorbed into a 
redefined present.  In light of this it must be concluded that as a presentist solution cone 
presentism fails. 
 
3.2 STR and the Problem of Differing Intuitions 
 I find the anti-verificationist line of attack against STR more compelling.  This 
approach may need to be nuanced a bit, for as Sider (2001: 42) notes, in clashes between 
science and metaphysics the results have generally favored science.  In spite of this 
verdict, one might justifiably ask whether science and metaphysics are actually at odds 
on this point.  What does STR really tell us about time?  If STR is a scientific theory, 
and if time is a metaphysical issue, we may wonder how much STR should be allowed to 
say on the matter.  According to George Bealer (1987), scientific essentialism is the 
doctrine that  
…There are truths that can be known to be necessary only if empirical evidence 
is used; more briefly, there are essences that can be known only with the aid of 
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empirical science.  For example, scientific essentialists hold that certain types of 
natural-kind identities (e.g., that water = H2O, that heat = mean kinetic energy, 
that gold = the element with atomic number 79) are necessary if true, and they 
hold that it is impossible for a person to know that such identities are true without 
the aid of empirical science.  So if scientific essentialists are right, the knowledge 
that such identities are necessary cannot be absolutely a priori…Instead, this 
knowledge must always be (at least) partially a posteriori; it is essentially a 
posteriori.  (291) 
 
The spirit of the argument against presentism from STR is clearly of this scientific 
essentialist bent, for it holds that there is necessarily no notion of absolute simultaneity 
within the four-dimensional spacetime manifold.  Contemporary physics posits the 
spatiotemporal manifold, as this framework provides the greatest amount of (scientific) 
explanatory power.  Through extensive experimentation it has been discovered that the 
notion of absolute simultaneity is incoherent.  This discovery is deemed to be a 
necessary one, as the notion of absolute simultaneity is incomprehensible within the 
framework of contemporary physics.   
But there is a problem here: how is the physicist able to say that the notion of 
absolute simultaneity is necessarily false?  Presumably she has conducted the 
appropriate experiments, read the important papers on the subject, and so on.  Sooner or 
later this chain of observation and testimony must end, and when it ends, what provides 
the starting point for the observation and testimony that follows?  Bealer’s answer is that 
intuitions serve as the initial point of departure for the physicist, since empirical 
evidence is unable to provide the conclusion that any physical occurrence is a necessary 
one (1987: 300).  If this is so, then what intuitions motivated STR (or the arguments 
from STR against presentism)?  It will not be important to try and enumerate all of them.  
What is crucial to recognize is that one of the intuitions holds that the speed of light 
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should decide certain notions concerning time.  For two observers O and O’ occupying 
two distinct reference frames, the propagation of a light signal from O to O’ is not 
instantaneous, but takes a certain amount of time to travel between the two frames, 
which means that what occurs at one frame will not be absolutely simultaneous with 
what occurs at the other frame.  But why should one agree with this intuition?  The 
speed of light is observable, whereas time is not.  And it was decided that difficulties 
concerning time are to be settled by means of observable phenomena, i.e. the speed of 
light.  Time itself cannot be observed, but where the behavior of a certain entity – light – 
is deemed an appropriate surrogate, time is thought to be within the jurisdiction of 
science.  But is this intuition beyond contention?  Would it be unreasonable to suppose 
that problems about time cannot be so resolved?  It would seem not.  Following Bealer’s 
notion of ‘intuitions’ as “noninferential beliefs regarding the applicability of a concept to 
a hypothetical case” (300), it is certainly plausible that one’s intuitions on the matter 
could be that the propagation of light has nothing whatever to do with the abstract issue 
of time.  The physicist’s intuitions concerning the hypothetical case of our two observers 
O and O’, is that the speed of light is applicable to the notion of simultaneity, with the 
result being that absolute simultaneity is rendered incoherent.  The presentist’s intuitions 
may be that the speed of light does not apply to the notion of simultaneity at all.  And 
there are further intuitions involved in the matter.  The physicist’s intuition is that the 
issue of time is to be decided on the basis of empirical science, whereas the presentist’s 
intuitions are that time is essentially a conceptual issue, to be decided without recourse 
to empirical observation. The argument against presentism from STR fails because the 
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objector bases her argument on empirical observation, which, as we have seen, carries 
no inherent necessity.  But the necessity is what gives the objection from STR its bite, 
and in order to account for this, the objector must admit that she is basing her empirical 
observation on certain intuitions, none of which the presentist is obliged to hold. 
 In conclusion, STR may or may not have something to say against presentism.  
What I have tried to demonstrate is that however this matter is decided, intuitions must 
play a key role.  Many presentists’ intuitions are that STR has nothing to do with 
presentism.  Opponents of presentism claim that their intuitions are very different: STR 
shows that presentism is not a viable philosophical position.  For my purposes, it has 
been sufficient to show that the presentist’s intuitions are perfectly justifiable, which 
further means that there is no reason for her to accept the intuitions of her opponents. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that many of the objections brought against presentism are 
persuasive, and that no compelling presentist answers have been given.  In light of this 
situation, there is a need for a view that shares similarities with presentism, while 
addressing the various deficiencies inherent in the original position.  I have argued that 
presentism* is such a view, incorporating what I take to be the most beneficial elements 
from presentism. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 I follow Michael Rea (2003) at several points in my explication of this issue. 
 
2 For example, see D.H. Mellor (1998) and Smith (1993) for two opposing views on this issue. 
 
3 For example, see Tom Crisp (2003) and Ned Markosian (unpublished). 
 
4 In what follows I will use ‘eternalist’ interchangeably with ‘non-presentist’.  For my concerns, it is 
generally the case that if one is not a presentist, then one is an eternalist.  Regardless, nothing in my 
arguments hinges on this decision; it is merely a convenient placeholder. 
 
5 On this point, see Markosian (forthcoming), Steven Savitt (2000), Michael Rea (2003), and Ted Sider 
(2001), among others. 
 
6 For more on the possibility of combining presentism with a tenseless/B-theory view of time, see Rea 
(2003).  For my purposes here, I will construe presentism similarly to the majority of those who endorse it, 
namely, as involving a commitment to a tensed/A-theory view of time. 
 
7 This is the view of such growing-block theorists as Broad (1959), and Tooley (1997), both of whom 
claim that the past exists, though the future consists in nothing at all. 
 
8 Hereafter, I will use the term ‘temporal slice(s)’ interchangeably with ‘physical atom(s)’.  For my 
purposes, they are identical. 
 
9 I follow Rea’s (2003) explication at several points in this paragraph. 
 
10 As noted in the introduction, I will not be offering here a separate analysis of the relative merits (or 
demerits) of presentism and presentism*.  As far as I can see, the argument from STR is addressed equally 
to both positions, and my proposed solution does not depend upon an adherence to either position at the 
expense of the other; both are perfectly acceptable. 
 
11 Sider (2001: 46). 
 
12 I follow Sider (2001: 43-44) closely in my explication of these three notions. 
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